In the study of industrial clusters, the relative importance, and possible interrelationship, of inter-firm cooperation in production and broad knowledge transfers (both unintentional spillovers and intentional sharing) have long been disputed. To shed light on this we study ceramic tableware manufacturers in the city of Lampang, Thailand. Data consist of face-to-face interviews with principals in thirty-four manufacturers, and with representatives of supporting institutions. We find that an unwillingness to share knowledge with potential competitors retards the development of specialization in production; the outcome of efforts by various government actors and some manufacturers to change this situation is uncertain.
Introduction
The literature on specialized industrial agglomerations, or 'clusters', describes two forms of positive externality arising from interactions between the co-located firms. One is the division of production between firms, on the basis either of specialization in particular functions or stages of production (specialist subcontracting), or of matching excess customer demand with excess capacity (capacity subcontracting). The other is the sharing or spill-over (where sharing is deliberate and spill-overs are inadvertent) of knowledge between firms, whether or not they are doing business with each other: this is Marshall's 'knowledge in the air'.
The early literature on neo-Marshallian industrial districts (we'll call them NMIDs; see, notably, Becattini, 1979; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Best, 1990; and Pyke, Becattini and Sengenberger, 1990; Saxenian, 1994; Humphrey and Schmitz, 1996) tended to treat the two as part of a package: both required a certain measure of openness and trust between firms that were potentially vulnerable -whether as competitors or as links in a supply chain -to each other; both facilitated ongoing product and process innovation through the interaction of specialists. Often, the two may be said to grow from a common cause -the same networks of civic engagement (Putnam, 1993) , or the same institutional frameworks (Brusco, 1982) ; similarly, both may be undermined by the same power asymmetries between firms, whether due to size differentials or differences in access to markets (Schmitz, 1995; Nadvi, 1999; Farrell and Knight, 2003; Lazerson and Lorenzoni, 2005 ).
Yet dyadic business interactions, and the broad sharing of commercial or technical knowledge, are distinct phenomena; one does not need to look far at all to find firms which are doing one and not the other (under 'firms' we will include, unless stated otherwise, individuals working in or on behalf of firms). As the literature on interactions between firms in clusters has grown, and spread across several disciplines, these two aspects of the problem have come often to be addressed as separate subjects: some research deals specifically with dyadic interactions, or networks based on such interactions (e.g., Lorenz, 1988; Uzzi, 1997) , while other deals with knowledge spill-overs (e.g., Breschi and Malerba, 2005; Belussi and Sammarra, 2010; D'Este, Iammarino and Guy, 2011) . Typologies of clusters (Storper and Harrison, 1991; Breschi and Lissoni, 2003; Markusen, 1996; Gordon and McCann, 2000; Iammarino and McCann, 2006) call our attention to the wide variety of structures within them, and to the sometimes divergent evolution of the two characteristics under discussion.
Is, then, the pairing of networked production and knowledge in the air, two pillars of the NMID model, of any importance? Are they linked by any more than the facts that certain circumstances of history or industrial structure can produce them both at the same time, and that certain cities and industries in which they both occurred, notably in the Third Italy, got studied and came to be seen as embodying a model? Is this 'model' kept alive by anything more than the confirmation bias inherent in the scholarly process of souring the world for cases of clusters with NMID characteristics? The stakes here are more than academic.
Regional development agencies, national governments, and international institutions both governmental and non-governmental, have cluster development programs (Braczyk, Cook and Heidenreich, 1998; Ceglie and Dini, 1999; Potter and Miranda, 2007; Borras and Tsagdis, 2008) . Some of these programs embrace the NMID model, others do not. The NMID model has proven difficult to replicate; it would help to know whether its constituent parts really are complementary. Malmberg and Maskell (MM -2002) have claimed that knowledge spillovers, and specialization and cooperation in production, are paired, but paired in an asymmetric way. Knowledge spillovers between firms engaged in the same stage(s) of production are, they say, the more powerful force, and come first; cooperation and specialization in production may (or may not) follow. MM further contend that knowledge spillovers are the reason clusters come into existence. Oinas and Marchionni (OM -2010) argue that MM's theory is not really an explanation for the existence of clusters, but an argument about what makes them competitive. We think that OM are correct in their recasting of MM. Moreover, when interpreted in OM's way, MM's theory provides a useful starting point for understanding the case we present below. The existence of the cluster we are studying is easily explained without any reference either to knowledge spillovers, or to vertical specialization or inter-firm cooperation within the basic production process; however, the weakness of knowledge spillovers appears to inhibit the development of vertical specialization, and to be a limiting factor in the cluster's dynamic competitiveness in the face of growing international competition.
MM are not concerned with deliberate knowledge sharing, but to them this is a non-issue because they assume that spatial proximity brings spillovers: "colocated firms undertaking similar activities find themselves in a situation where every difference in the solutions chosen, however small, can be observed and compared.
… spatial proximity brings with it the special feature of spontaneous automatic observation" (MM, p. 439). Others, however, have found great variability between clusters in this regard: Best (1990) contrasts the secretive (and declining) furniture manufacturing cluster in north London with the open (and, at the time, thriving) ones of the Third Italy; Saxenian (1994) draws a similar contrast between the high-tech clusters of Route 128 and the Silicon Valley. More recent research has tended to focus on different forms of proximity (spatial, cognitive, organizational…) any of which may facilitate knowledge transfer (Boschma, 2004; D'Este et al, 2011) ; in this sense, a low level of localized knowledge spillover could be attributed to the absence of necessary complementary forms of proximity. In the case studied here: many of the SMEs in the cluster studied are run by people who lack the technical background (cognitive proximity, or what Cohen and Levinthal (1990) would call absorptive capacity) to make the necessary spillovers happen, or even to be on the receiving end of intentional knowledge sharing. MM incorporate such considerations tangentially, as institutional features whose failure may lead to the decline of a cluster. In any case, we should distinguish between these non-spatial types of proximity (indicative of an opportunity, or ability, to share knowledge) and the issue of agency, or willingness to share knowledge, which is a central question for Best and Saxenian. Our case concerns a cluster of ceramic tableware manufacturers located in and around the city of Lampang in northern Thailand. Historically, firms in the cluster have integrated production vertically, avoided outsourcing, and been extremely reluctant to share technical or commercial information outside of very small circles of associates. After several decades of rapid growth, Lampang firms lost much of their domestic market in the wake of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, and then saw first their export markets and then their domestic ones threatened by China and other emerging manufacturers. The Thai government, with the cooperation of UNIDO and others from abroad, initiated a cluster development program in 2002. In 2005, we interviewed thirty-four manufacturers of ceramic tableware in and around the city of Lampang.
Data
Ceramics manufacturers in Lampang specialize variously in tableware, gift and decorative items, sanitary ware, railing and insulators. This study focuses on tableware manufacturers. These are more differentiated in terms of size, market niche, and product quality than are producers in the other categories. Tableware is also interesting because of the segment's balance between international and domestic markets. 101 of Lampang's ceramics factories are listed by the Lampang Ceramic Association or the Ceramic Development Center as tableware manufacturers. In 2005, we approached owners of all of these, requesting interviews. Of the thirty four who agreed, four are large firms with over 500 employees, nine are medium-sized with between 100 and 499, seventeen are small firms of between ten and ninety-nine, and three are very small firms with fewer than ten employees (see Table 1 ); all are domestically owned. A few turned out not to manufacture tableware, but did manufacture other ceramic products (see Table 1 , column 5). One of the owners was also the president of Lampang Ceramic Association. Also interviewed were the head of the Ceramic Development Center, and the IFCT's cluster development agent. Interviews were semi-structured, conducted face-to-face, and recorded, in Thai. They typically lasted about an hour. Quotations in this paper are translations from the recorded interviews. We should note that certain key English terms have entered the local vocabulary, including 'cluster', and the names given to some of the loose cooperative groupings of firms, such as 'Trust' and 'Believe'.
[ Table 1 about here]
The interviews addressed a range of concerns, including modes of access to foreign markets, sources of technology, the role of Chinese ethnicity in business relationships -and also the matters of inter-firm information sharing and cooperation in production, addressed in this paper.
The Thai Ceramic Industry and the Lampang Cluster
Thailand is not historically a significant producer, or user, of ceramics. The In the late 1970s, the industry began to develop rapidly, and some factories began to export. In this period, wood-fired kilns began to be replaced by gas-fired ones, which allowed better and more consistent product quality and were suited to a wider range of products. Many new firms emerged to produce items such as railings, tiles, and sanitary fixtures. The existing tableware producers developed new lines of blue and white items in addition to the traditional chicken bowl.
As with the Thai economy and exports generally, the industry boomed from 1987 to 1997, and the number of manufacturers increased rapidly. The traditional chicken bowl and blue and white items were augmented by new western styles of dinnerware set. Some firms started to produce made-to-order items for export markets only. Competition in export markets in the early 1990s was relatively weak. The major ceramic exporters were Taiwan and Japan. Taiwan lost its General System of Preference (GSP) export rights to the US in this period, while Japanese makers focused on high-end technology and high-value added ceramics for medical instruments and electronics. In this period, too, the Thai government's industrial development policy finally reached beyond Bangkok, to support regional industries. Lampang ceramic was targeted for assistance in both productivity improvement and exports. The local institutional framework supporting the ceramics industry, developed during this period, is discussed below.
During this period there was also increased differentiation between small firms with low technology making poor quality chicken bowl for the domestic market, and larger firms with newer technology making better quality and newly designed products for export markets. The number of new SMEs increased, and large firms extended their business and improved quality to concentrate on export markets. Domestic and regional markets were hard hit by the East Asian economic crisis of 1998 to 2000. Many manufacturers of railings and tiles -heavily dependent on building construction -went bankrupt; others were reduced in size. Among tableware producers, the large export-oriented firms benefited from the devaluation of the currency; medium sized firms who produced for domestic markets were pushed to improve their quality so that they could export; many small firms focusing on domestic market simply closed down.
In contrast to the 1987-1997 period, international competition in the early 2000s was fierce, not least because of growing competition from China. Lampang's exporters responded with an increased emphasis on design. At the same time, the demand for chicken bowl on the domestic market rose, after several decades of decline. One reason for this was that the new production technologies, together with design-led competition in the cluster, had renewed the product. Small firms re-emerged to produce chicken bowl for the low end of the domestic market.
The development of the Lampang cluster can be easily explained without invoking knowledge sharing between firms, or cooperation or specialization in production: the local availability of good quality clay; in early decades, the low costs of wood to fuel kilns (this has since been supplanted by gas), of labor and of real estate, relative to Bangkok; then, after the initial formation of the cluster, proximity to specialized suppliers of machinery, materials, and skilled labor; inertia, favoring the co-location of new firms established both by younger generations of factory-owning families, and former employees of the established firms; and government support (credit, technical services) aimed at developing the cluster. Both the circulation of knowledge and cooperation in production have come to be of interest, however, to a range of public actors and to some Lampang manufacturers, as factors affecting the competitive position of the cluster.
Promoting the NMID model in Lampang
The institutional support provided to Lampang ceramics manufacturers has grown, first as regional (non-Bangkok) industry came to be regarded by the government as important, and more recently as Lampang has been identified as an important and promising specialized industrial cluster. We will discuss the roles Even within vertically integrated factories, the ceramic production process is divided into distinct stages: clay must be mixed, then formed; it is then typically given a biscuit (or bisque) firing, which hardens the clay but does not vitrify it; after glazing it is given a final firing (see Table 2 ). As an industry, entry and exit barriers are low, in part because of the ready market for used equipment. Indeed, in Lampang, the larger and more technically sophisticated firms tend to purchase used equipment from Japanese, Taiwanese and German sources, modifying it to meet their own needs. Small firms tend to purchase equipment, often new, from Thai manufacturers. The Thai equipment manufacturers imitate foreign designs; their quality is regarded as lower, but for a ceramics manufacturer without its own technicians they offer the advantage of ready service. The IFCT and the Cluster Project help small firms with equipment purchases, further lowering entry barriers. The most salient remaining barrier to market entry and successful operation is, from most accounts, the scarcity of experience and technical knowledge on the part of small factory owners and staff.
[ Table 2 about here]
Secrecy and subcontracting

Sharing knowledge in small circles
Lampang firms typical integrate production vertically, so that little or no information needs to be shared with other manufacturers on a routine basis. Many report little co-operation or voluntary information sharing beyond a small group of trusted firms. One representative of the traditional pattern is Firm 1, the largest in the cluster. One of its principals tells us: Firm 33 made clear elsewhere in the interview that 'talk about market selling price' refers to price fixing among producers in the village. Thus we see small firms availing themselves of the public support provided for their industry, and cooperating to fix prices, but refusing to share knowledge of production techniques, design, or markets.
Firm 34, the smallest interviewed ('no employees -just grandma, my sister, and me') described how knowledge is gained from working in larger factories; from talking with employees of such factories; from her kiln supplier (a local manufacturer); from the larger ceramics factory that supplies her with raw materials; but not from other small factories in the same village:
The household factories will not openly share information. If It appears, however, that for one reason or another, the norm of secrecy is loosening its grip. Sometimes this is presented as a matter of generational change.
We heard this from people who told us that they were not inclined to share information with other manufacturers, such as the owner of Firm 10:
It is a rule that the owner of a factory should not go into other factories. This is the current situation, but it is better than before: in my father's generation, the owners even did not even talk to each other.
We also heard it from the owner of Firm 19, perhaps the most enthusiastic cooperator interviewed. In addition to his participation in the Believe group (see 
Subcontracting and specialization
Firm 19 is at the lower end of the market, producing cheap chicken bowl for domestic customers; his subcontracting is essentially a putting out system, employing household micro-factories. Firms serving higher-priced, design-driven export markets have different requirements when sharing work. Most firms, however, either subcontract some work to others, or take work in from others; some do both. Interviewees often referred to subcontracting as something done of necessity, and best avoided.
Subcontracting typically requires some sharing of technical knowledge, and also reveals to another manufacturer features of the customer's products and market.
There was some concern expressed about copying of designs, but concern about copying by local competitors was primarily at the lower quality, domestic, end of the market: in the export market, more restricted and formalized channels to buyers made copying less easy, and the principal threat was seen as coming from foreign competitors. And, while copying was rife at the low end of the market, it occurred with or without subcontracting.
While firms were reluctant to share technical knowledge with other firms as a general rule, none expressed any reservations about doing so with subcontractors.
2
The problem in dealing with subcontractors was finding ones with sufficient knowledge and appropriate equipment to make a product which would match others in the same product line, and which could reliably deliver good quality products on time. The question then was not what the customer was willing to tell the subcontractor, but how ready the subcontractor was to make use of any knowledge that was shared.
There is some indication that both horizontal (capacity) subcontracting and vertical (stage) specialization increased in the early 2000s. One reason for this is that pressure for subcontracting grows out of foreign customers' efforts to reduce inventory costs, and to remain free to make changes in their product lines. Both this pressure, and the difficulties it entails, are described by Firm 24 is another member of Trust, and works on both ends of the subcontracting relationship. Keeping this business within the Trust group when possible means "fewer headaches".
Firms described three problems with subcontracting: the sheer work involved in supervising the relationship, the risk that the subcontractor will fail either to deliver a suitable product or fail to do so on time, and the worry that subcontractors may copy designs. We would expect all of these problems to be greater if subcontracting is exceptional, rather than routine. There are two distinct reasons for this: one, that there are certain skills and organizational capabilities involved in both ends of the subcontracting relationship, which would improve with practice; the other, the value which a firm places on its own reputational capital should increase as the proportion of its business done as a subcontractor increases.
Not surprisingly, firms which work in subcontracting or stage production relationships regularly, seem to be more at ease with it. Firm 21 decided, in 2000 (the wake of the Asian financial crisis) to specialize in biscuit ware, leaving the design, glazing, decoration and final firing to its customers. Most Lampang manufacturers do both the biscuit firing and subsequent stages such as glazing and the final firing; while some biscuit production is subcontracted to one manufacturer or another on an ad hoc basis, Firm 21 is the only biscuitware specialist in Thailand. The owner is an advocate for the benefits of stage production: Firm 28 says that being a subcontractor "is, just say, less of a headache", allowing him to avoid the costs associated with "marketing, packing, transportation, and so on."
Most
Taking the epidemiological liberty of generalizing from four mentions of headaches, we might say: ad hoc subcontracting to non-specialists causes headaches; regular sub-contracting between specialists can relieve them.
'Cluster groups'
Firm 21, the biscuitware specialist, is a member of a group called Trust. It is a voluntary group, not based on family, shared ownership, or systematic integration of production. The other members of Trust produce tableware and decorative items, primarily for the domestic market. Although Firm 21 supplies some biscuitware to other members of Trust, these firms are small, and Firm 21's principal customers are larger firms outside of the group. The owners of the firms in Trust had been friends for some years before forming the group. The lack of perceived conflict is not surprising since, being a specialist in certain stages of production, Firm 21 is not seen by its customers as a competitor.
Conclusion
Ad-hoc cooperation in production is common in Lampang, and while it is often undertaken with reluctance there is reason to believe that it increased in the early 2000s -partly due to time pressure from buyers, and partly due to the efforts of the agencies and manufacturers associated with the Cluster Project. Almost all manufacturers -including all but two of those interviewed here -retain vertical integration from the preparation of clay to the sale of the finished product. The traditions of secrecy with regard to both technical and market knowledge are eroding, but remain dominant.
What constrains the emergence of new specialists, given the evident demand for subcontractors' services, and the apparent advantages of using specialist subcontractors?
An explanation might start from the self-reproducing nature of the cluster's industrial organization. First, given that most manufacturers internalize the various stages of ceramics production, there is not a sufficiently large niche in which specialists can emerge, and possibly a low return to investment in reputation (Lazerson and Lorenzoni, 2005) . Second, the larger manufacturers have different needs from the small and medium-sized ones, and are disinclined either to share their expertise with smaller firms which have nothing to offer in return, or to promote public provision of expertise -a situation often reported in clusters in developing countries (e.g. Schmitz, 1995; Nadvi, 1999) . The policy of most large Lampang manufacturers is, to invert Marshall's phrase, to keep their own knowledge out of the air. Though this behavior would appear to reflect the interests of large firms, it is reproduced down to micro-firms at the village level.
Third, the primary source of technical and industry knowledge for both employees and owners is from working in the vertically integrated production systems which exist -most training is done by employers; small factories in Lampang are typically started by former employees of larger ones; and small manufacturers seek to hire employees previously trained by larger ones, and seek advice from employees of larger ones. The larger Lampang manufacturers are essentially mass producers and, as such, economize on skilled production labor through standardization of process and product, and through extensive internal divisions of labor.
To some extent, these same factors can be understood as obstacles to buzz, to spillovers and sharing, to knowledge-in-the-air. However we conceptualize the causes -or preventatives -of localized knowledge spillovers and sharing, it does appear that limited circulation of technical and market knowledge is one factor inhibiting the emergence of specialist manufacturers. The two specialist manufacturers interviewed are, in the sense of Piore and Sabel (1984) , flexible specialists: they are run by people with the technical background and experience needed to meet the varied production specifications of demanding customers. Most of the smaller Lampang manufacturers are not in a position to offer such services.
In this sense, Malmberg and Maskell are correct in putting horizontal knowledge transfer first, with the possibility that vertical specialization will follow. However, contrary to MM, knowledge transfer does not follow reliably from spatial proximity.
To some extent this is due to lack of cognitive proximity (firms -usually smaller ones -with insufficient technical capabilities may not be in a position to glean knowledge from the air, or even to make use of information which is deliberately offered to them), and part due to a practice of secrecy. These two obstacles to knowledge transfer are complementary -the decision to keep secrets helps maintain cognitive distance, and the cognitive distance makes it easier to keep secrets -but distinct. Consistent with the NMID model, broad knowledge transfer and productive specialization are part of a package: the problem here is not the logic of the package, but the obstacles to its delivery.
The Cluster Project can be understood as an effort to break out of the selfsustaining cycle of secrecy and vertically integrated production. It has promoted networks of SMEs, and also a shift toward the wide sharing of technical knowledge.
It builds on pre-existing programs, notably the CDC, which provide technical resources geared to the needs of small and medium manufacturers. These appear to be appropriate measures if the objective is to shift production to a system of specialized SMEs operating in networks. The question, which we can only leave to time and further research, is whether they will be adequate. • Clay is supplied either directly by mining companies, or by compound suppliers which do more of the prepartion; small manufacturers often buy prepared clay from larger manufacturers.
• Subcontracting of production may or may not include subcontracting of clay preparation (if so, formulae are provided).
2. Forming clay: slip casting, jolleying, jiggering (the latter two are machine methods of turning a ball of clay in a plaster mould).
Plaster moulds often supplied by specialists.
Some small manufacturers making cheap goods for the domestic market put out slip casting and greenware decoration to households.
Forming the clay and biscuit firing may be outsourced together, either to factories with spare capacity or to the specialist bisucuit supplier.
The basic production process, including clay formation, decoration / glazing, and both firings, is often subcontracted. Usually this is ad hoc, due to the lead firm's capacity constraints; sometimes it is because the subcontractor has specialized equipment the lead firm lacks.
3. Greenware (the formed clay, airdried) may be decorated.
4. First (biscuit, or bisque) firing. This makes a hard, but still porous (e.g., terracotta), reducing breakage during glazing / transportation / final firing.
5. Painting / glazing.
• Larger manufacturers usually formulate their own glaze; small manufacturers often buy it from larger ones. At the time of the interviews, Lampang did not have a specialist glaze supplier, though it had had in the past.
• Firms contracting out production generally supply glaze to the subcontractor. 6. Final firing
